Analysis · Exor N.V.
Ferrari buys back its shares: the discreet driver of Exor's value
A third tranche of €250 million begins. For Exor, the 19.5% economic shareholder and largest holder of voting rights, the mechanism is favorable only if the price paid and the future use of the shares are also favorable.
Courtesy translation of the French original.
Exor owns 37.8 million Ferrari shares. At the end of 2025, this single stake was worth €12.037 billion and represented 32.4% of the holding company's gross assets. Therefore, when Ferrari buys back its own shares, it is not carrying out a peripheral transaction: it is acting on Exor's most important asset. The third tranche, capped at €250 million, begins on September 2 and must be completed by December 16, 2026.
In summary
Ferrari has already spent €510.8 million since launching its new multi-year program on January 5, 2026. It aims for approximately €3.5 billion in share buybacks by 2030. Since Exor is not selling in these market transactions, its stake in the outstanding shares can mechanically increase. However, a buyback does not automatically create €250 million in value: Ferrari is exchanging cash for its own shares. The transaction is only profitable if the capital is better utilized and invested elsewhere.
Why this matters to Exor shareholders
Ferrari is by far Exor's largest holding: €12.0 billion out of €37.1 billion in gross assets at the end of 2025. Exor holds 19.5% of the economic rights and 32.3% of the voting rights, thanks to the special voting rights structure. Every Ferrari capital allocation decision-investment, dividend, acquisition, or buyback-therefore directly influences the holding company's value and influence. The third tranche represents approximately 2.1% of the value of Exor's stake at the end of 2025: this is a comparison of scale, not a measure of NAV accretion, which depends on the price paid, the canceled shares, and Exor's actual participation in the program.
What has just been decided
Ferrari has completed its second tranche of €250 million. It purchased 655,884 shares in Milan for €200 million and 159,855 shares in New York for the equivalent of approximately €50 million. As of August 28, the company held 1,590,804 treasury shares, net of shares allocated to incentive plans, representing 0.90% of the issued ordinary shares.
The third tranche uses the same budget: up to €200 million will be executed in Milan by a financial institution under a non-discretionary mandate; up to €50 million can be purchased in New York on Ferrari's instructions. The entire transaction is financed from available cash.
The word "up to" is important. Ferrari is not necessarily promising to spend exactly €250 million. The pace and volume of the New York purchases will depend, in particular, on the market. The shareholder authorization allows for the repurchase of up to 10% of ordinary shares over eighteen months and expires on October 14, 2027, unless renewed.
The repurchase as seen from the parent company
Exor is not Ferrari's accounting parent company, but it is its controlling shareholder. Share buybacks can benefit the company in three ways. First, treasury shares generally do not vote or receive dividends: the shares remaining in circulation carry a slightly higher proportion of effective economic rights. Second, if the shares are cancelled, this increase becomes permanent. Third, reducing the average number of shares outstanding can increase earnings per share, all else being equal.
The distinction is crucial: Exor retains 19.5% of the economic rights calculated on the shares issued, according to its annual report. Its legal percentage does not automatically increase each week. It is its share of the net treasury stock, or its effective economic share, that can increase. And if Ferrari then reuses the shares to compensate its employees, part of the effect is reversed.
The five-step mechanism
Why price is more important than amount
A company with €250 million in cash is worth, all other things being equal, €250 million more than after spending it. During a buyout, it receives its own shares in exchange. If these shares are actually worth more than the price paid, the remaining shareholders profit. If they are overvalued, they lose: the pie shrinks faster than the number of slices.
Ferrari is an exceptional company, but it is generally valued as a rare luxury business, not as an ordinary automaker. This quality makes its cash flow strong; it also makes the price test more demanding. The press release does not publish any intrinsic value estimate, and Exor does not say to what extent it considers the acquisition to be accretive.
There is a second opportunity cost. Every euro spent on the acquisitions is no longer available to develop new models, finance electrification, expand brand experiences, strengthen the balance sheet, or pay a dividend. Management implicitly believes it can do all these things and still return capital. Exor shareholders should verify this assumption in future cash flows.
The Exor Paradox: Selling and then letting Ferrari buy back
In 2025, Exor itself sold approximately 6.7 million Ferrari shares for €2.987 billion. Its economic stake decreased from 22.9% to 19.5%. The holding company aimed to reduce its concentration, finance new investments, and launch its own €1 billion share buyback program.
This move is not inconsistent with Ferrari's current share buybacks. The two companies are pursuing two distinct allocation strategies. Exor is monetizing part of a position that has become enormous-Ferrari still represented 32.4% of its gross assets at the end of 2025-while Ferrari is redistributing its excess cash. If Exor does not participate in the market purchases, its effective weight can gradually increase after the voluntary reduction in 2025, without putting another euro on the table.
This paradox is particularly elegant from the holding company's perspective: it has freed up nearly €3 billion to diversify its portfolio, while allowing the underlying company to gradually consolidate the rights of the remaining shareholders. But this elegance depends, once again, on the price at which Ferrari buys back the shares and the actual destination of the shares.
Influence, Dividends, and Share Plans
Exor holds 32.3% of the voting rights, significantly more than its 19.5% economic rights. Reducing the free float could strengthen its relative influence if the repurchased shares do not have voting rights. However, it does not alter the special rights attached to loyal shares and must be analyzed in conjunction with the complete capital structure.
Shares from the second tranche can also fulfill the requirements of share-based incentive plans. This is a legitimate use: to attract and align management. However, in this case, part of the repurchase compensates for dilution rather than permanently reducing the capital. Therefore, the correct indicator is not the gross amount repurchased, but the net change in the number of shares outstanding after allocations.
What can create value
Excess cash flow, purchases at a price below intrinsic value, permanent cancellation of shares, and no proportional sale by Exor.
What can dilute it
Excessive valuation, reinvestment of shares in stock plans, future cash needs, or investment sacrificed to finance buybacks.
Opulation reading
The Ferrari program is a capital allocation policy, not a magic trick. Its impact on Exor is nonetheless considerable because it concerns its main asset and the holding company remains a stable shareholder. In the short term, the third tranche is modest. On the scale of €3.5 billion, the cumulative effect can become visible in the number of shares, effective economic rights, and earnings per share.
Exor investors must therefore monitor four variables: the average price paid, the net number of shares actually withdrawn, the free cash flow retained by Ferrari, and the stake Exor chooses to keep. Value creation lies at the intersection of these four data points-not in the announced amount.